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The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) is the primary instrument for 
federal agencies to consider the environmental impacts caused by the decisions that they make 
pursuant to their statutory authority.  NEPA requires all federal agencies to “stop, look, and 
listen” prior to taking significant actions that could affect the human environment.  Agencies 
must consider the values of environmental preservation for all significant actions and adhere to 
procedural measures to ensure that those values are fully considered.  Federal agencies are 
further required consider alternative ways of accomplishing their missions in ways which are less 
damaging to the environment.  Section 101(b) of NEPA states that "it is the continuing 
responsibility of the federal government to use all practicable means, consistent with other 
essential considerations of national policy" to avoid environmental degradation, preserve 
historic, cultural, and natural resources, and "promote the widest range of beneficial uses of the 
environment without undesirable and unintentional consequences."  Also, NEPA created the 
Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), a division of the Executive Office of the President, 
which coordinates the environmental efforts of federal agencies and other White House offices in 
the development of environmental policies and initiatives.  NEPA assigns CEQ the task of 
overseeing the environmental impact assessment process of federal agencies ensuring that 
agencies meet their obligations under the Act.  Further, CEQ mediates disputes from time t time 
between agencies regarding the adequacy of assessments of environmental impacts.   
Ultimately, NEPA makes environmental protection a part of the mandate of every federal 
agency.  Virtually every agency of the federal government has prepared an environmental impact 
statement, and most agencies have also been subject to NEPA lawsuits.  While there are 
differences among each agency’s unique approach to implementing NEPA, these differences are 
somewhat pronounced among so-called “independent” agencies.  This paper examines the 
approach of one such independent agency: the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).  
This paper addresses the role of CEQ with respect to the NEPA obligations of independent 
agencies and offer examples of how several independent agencies approach NEPA. 
II. Independent Agencies 
Before discussing NEPA’s unique relationship with independent agencies, we must first 
define an independent agency.  Unfortunately, this is not a straightforward task.  As a general 
matter, independent agencies are those agencies that exist outside of the federal executive 
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departments (i.e., agencies headed by a member of the president’s Cabinet).  Independent 
regulatory agencies were created by Congress in an effort to bring expertise-driven decision 
making to administrative governance.  Constitutionally-speaking, such agencies remain part of 
the executive branch, but may exercise some independence from executive control.  Usually, 
independent agencies are headed by a multi-membered collegial body with each member serving 
a staggered term.  Although members may be appointed by the president and confirmed by the 
Senate, the president's power to dismiss the agency head or a member may be limited to 
removals “for cause.”  In other words, the president usually cannot remove a member of such an 
agency because the president disagrees with his or her policies or politics.  
The legal support for the existence of independent agencies was first established by the 
U.S. Supreme Court in Humphrey’s Executor vs. U.S., 295 U.S. 602 (1935).  This case involved 
a claim by the executor of a former commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission for the 
payment of salary for the period of his term after President Roosevelt effectively removed him 
from office.  The Court held that the president lacked the authority to remove the commissioner 
for the purpose of disagreeing with the commissioner’s views.  To supports its conclusion, the 
Court found that Congress, in creating the Federal Trade Commission, had given the agency both 
legislative and judicial authority, and required the agency to discharge its duties independently of 
executive control.  In holding that such distinction had a constitutional basis, the Court described 
the agency accordingly: 
“The Federal Trade Commission is an administrative body created by Congress to carry 
into effect legislative policies embodied in the statute in accordance with the legislative 
standard therein prescribed, and to perform other specified duties as a legislative or as a 
judicial aid. Such a body cannot in any proper sense be characterized as an arm or an eye 
of the executive. Its duties are performed without executive leave and, in the 
contemplation of the statute, must be free from executive control.”  
 
295 U.S. at 628 (emphasis added).  The Humphrey’s Executor decision provides some evidence 
of a constitutional basis for treating independent regulatory agencies somewhat differently than 
other agencies.  However, there is no formal distinction between agencies in the executive 
branch; rather, there are simply layers of independence that Congress has provided each agency.     
III. NEPA’s Application to Independent Agencies 
Section 102 of NEPA makes it clear that the law applies to “all agencies of the Federal 
Government.”  Therefore, NEPA does not make any distinction between independent and 
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executive agencies.  Section 102 further requires all agencies to “identify and develop methods 
and procedures, in consultation with the Council on Environmental Quality  . . . which will 
insure that presently unquantified environmental amenities and values may be given appropriate 
consideration in decisionmaking along with economic and technical considerations.”  42 USC 
4332.  Notwithstanding the broad scope of NEPA with respect to federal agencies, the uniform 
application of NEPA in coordination with CEQ remains a somewhat illusive concept.   
NEPA does not address whether CEQ’s interpretation of NEPA’s requirements are 
binding upon federal agencies.  Following President Nixon’s issuance of Executive Order 11514 
in 1970 (“Protection and Enhancement of Environmental Quality,” 35 Fed. Reg. 4247), which 
authorized CEQ to provide guidance to federal agencies, CEQ issued guidelines for the 
preparation of environmental impact statements (EIS).  However, federal agencies failed to apply 
CEQ’s guidelines consistently.  Federal courts were also quick to point out that the guidelines 
were not binding upon federal agencies.  For example, in NRDC v. Callaway, 524 F.2d 79, 86 
n.8 (2d Cir. 1975), the court noted that “CEQ Guidelines are only advisory, since the CEQ has 
no authority to prescribe regulations governing compliance with NEPA.”  As mentioned above, 
CEQ lacked the express statutory authority to promulgate binding rules implementing NEPA.  In 
1977, perhaps in an effort to address CEQ’s apparent lack of legislative authority, President 
Carter issued Executive Order 11991 (“Relating to Protection and Enhancement of 
Environmental Quality,” 42 Fed. Reg. 26967), which expressly required federal agency 
compliance with CEQ’s NEPA regulations.  The Executive Order required agencies to “comply 
with the regulations issued by the Council except where such compliance would be inconsistent 
with statutory requirements.”   
Perhaps not surprisingly, Executive Order 11991 did not end the controversy surrounding 
CEQ’s authority.  From a legal perspective, any executive order issued by the president must be 
based on either statutory authority or inherent constitutional authority.  Therefore, in order for an 
executive order to become binding on an independent agency, Congress must have granted the 
president the authority to issue an executive order that applies to that agency.  In many cases, 
however, the president will not have the specific statutory authority to include independent 
regulatory agencies within the scope of an executive order.  In such situations, the president will 
have to rely on his or her authority under Article II of the Constitution to “take Care that the laws 
be faithfully executed.”  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.  Some legal scholars questioned the legal 
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authority for CEQ’s role in legislating NEPA processes for federal agencies.  For example, 
Professor Whitney (1991) argued that CEQ was intended to act primarily in an advisory 
capacity.  He noted that Congress stopped short of granting any authority to the CEQ to control 
or veto the activities of other agencies, and actually expressly rejected an original version of 
Section 102(2)(B) providing for CEQ “review and approval” of federal agency methods for 
giving “appropriate considerations to presently unquantified environmental amenities and 
values.”  Rather, Congress simply required that agencies “consult” with CEQ.  An example of 
this reasoning appeared in federal court in TOMAC v. Norton, 433 F.3d 852, 861 (D.C. Cir. 
2006), where the U.S. Count of the Appeals for the D.C. Circuit openly questioned the authority 
of CEQ to issue binding regulations for any federal agency. 
IV. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
Congress created the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in 1974 as an 
independent agency in order to ensure the safe use of radioactive materials for beneficial civilian 
purposes while protecting people and the environment.  The NRC regulates commercial nuclear 
power plants and other uses of nuclear materials, including nuclear medicine and nuclear fuel 
cycle activities.  The NRC is headed by five commissioners, each appointed by the president and 
confirmed by the Senate for five-year terms.  The president must designated one commissioner 
to be the chairman and official spokesperson of the Commission. 
The NRC’s statutory authority and structure establish the agency’s independent status.  
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (AEA), provides the NRC with the authority to 
issue regulations that govern nuclear reactor and nuclear material safety and adjudicate related 
legal matters.  42 U.S.C. 2011.  In other words, the NRC exercises both legislative and judicial 
functions.  In addition, NRC’s commissioners enjoy the aforementioned “for-cause” removal 
protection.  The Energy Reorganization Act, Section 102(e), provides that “Any member of the 
Commission may be removed by the President for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance 
in office.”  42 USC 5841.  This is in contrast to the concept ingrained in executive branch 
agencies, whose members serve “at the pleasure of the president” and can be removed for 
whatever reason the president decides.   
V. NRC’s Relationship with CEQ 
The NRC has held a longstanding policy that CEQ’s regulations cannot substantively 
bind independent agencies.  The NRC first expressed this policy in response to CEQ’s issuance 
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of its draft NEPA regulations for public comment.  43 Fed. Reg. 25230 (June 9, 1978).  The 
NRC believed that CEQ’s proposed regulations represented an improper interference with the 
decision-making of an independent regulatory agency.  NRC’s opinion embodied the concept 
underlying Humphrey’s Executor, as Congress had provided NRC with an independent structure 
in the AEA and therefore had presumably intended the NRC to be free from executive control.  
In promulgating its NEPA regulations, CEQ did not address in the rule’s statement of 
considerations (SOC) whether its regulations could have a substantive impact on the duties and 
policies of independent agencies.  Therefore, NRC and CEQ remained at a stalemate.   
The NRC further articulated its position in the SOCs for NRC’s NEPA implementing 
regulations in 10 C.F.R. Part 51, which added some clarity to its position.  In issuing the final 
rule, the NRC stated that “as a matter of law, the NRC as an independent regulatory agency can 
be bound by CEQ’s NEPA regulations only insofar as those regulations are procedural or 
ministerial in nature.”  Environmental Protection Regulations for Domestic Licensing and 
Related Conforming Amendments (Final Rule), 49 Fed. Reg. 9352 (March 12, 1984).  Therefore, 
NRC had acknowledged that CEQ regulations binding on the NRC, but only to the extent that 
such rules are “procedural” in nature.  Further, the NRC has made attempts to comply with 
related Executive Orders to the extent possible, while maintaining that the NRC is not necessary 
bound by them.  For example, President Clinton issued Executive Oder 12,898, directing all 
federal agencies to develop strategies for considering environmental justice in their programs, 
policies, and activities.  “Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority 
Populations and Low-Income Populations,” 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (1995).  The NRC sent a letter to 
the White House confirming its commitment to endeavor to carry out the measures as part of its 
compliance with NEPA requirements.  
VI. NRC Cases Involving CEQ 
 As discussed above, the NRC has argued that CEQ regulations can only bind the agency 
where they are procedural in nature.  Therefore, the NRC must evaluate on a case-by-case basis 
whether a particular CEQ regulation is either “substantive” or “procedural.”  The NRC has 
confronted this issue infrequently, and only a few cases provide some insight into the NRC’s 





a. Limerick Ecology Action, 869 F.2d 719 (3rd Cir. 1989)  
Limerick Ecology Action involved a challenge to the NRC’s granting of an operating 
license to the Limerick Nuclear Power Generating Station.  The intervening group in the case 
argued that NRC’s NEPA analysis was flawed because it did not comply with CEQ’s “worst 
case analysis” regulation in 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22(b).  The NRC had previously declined to adopt 
this provision in its NEPA implementing regulations at 10 C.F.R. Part 51.  49 Fed. Reg. at 9856-
57.  Holding that the NRC was not required to conduct a worst case analysis, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit explained that CEQ guidelines are not binding on an agency to the 
extent that the agency has not expressly adopted them.  The court also noted that CEQ had 
substantially amended its worst case analysis regulation while the case was still pending to 
eliminate the requirement that a worst case analysis be performed.  Instead, CEQ required only 
“reasonably foreseeable” adverse impacts to be analyzed, even if the probability of such impacts 
is “low.”  51 Fed. Reg. 15,618 (April 25, 1986).   
Limerick Ecology Action represents an example where the NRC considered the CEQ 
regulation at issue to be “substantive” in nature, and therefore could not bind the agency.  NEPA 
contains no express or implicit requirement for the analysis of a worst case scenario.  As 
evidenced by CEQ’s amendment of the regulations to more closely track NRC’s analysis, NRC’s 
view of NEPA’s requirement was likely well-founded and not necessarily at odds with CEQ’s 
ultimately policy views.      
b. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), 
CLI-11-11, 74 NRC 427 (2011) 
Once again, this case involved CEQ’s regulation regarding “Incomplete or unavailable 
information.”  This action involved the application to renew operator licenses for Diablo Canyon 
Nuclear Power Plant Units 1 and 2.  The Intervenors, San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace, argued 
that CEQ’s regulation at 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 required that a probabilistic analysis of the risks 
posed by the a fault known as the “Shoreline Fault” was essential to the NRC’s environmental 
analysis and must be included unless the cost would be exorbitant.  Section 1502.22 pertains to 
inclusion in an EIS of incomplete or unavailable information relevant to “reasonably foreseeable 
significant adverse impacts.”  The NRC’s Atomic Safety and Licensing Board admitted the 
contention, but the Commission struck the Board’s reference to the CEQ regulation.  The 
Commission stated that it may “look to CEQ regulations for guidance, including section 
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1502.22.”  However, the Commission reiterated that its “longstanding policy is that the NRC, as 
an independent regulatory agency, is not bound by those portions of CEQ's NEPA regulations 
that, like section 1502.22, have a substantive impact on the way in which the Commission 
performs its regulatory functions.”  CLI-11-11 at 23 (internal citations omitted).   
c. Brodsky vs. NRC, 704 F.3d 113 (2nd Cir. 2013) 
This lawsuit involved a NEPA challenge to NRC’s action, but in a primarily “procedural” 
context.  The plaintiff, Brodsky, challenged NRC’s approval of fire-protection exemptions at the 
Indian Point Energy Center and argued that the NRC should have held a hearing prior to granting 
the exemptions.  The NRC had issued an environmental assessment (EA) finding that Entergy's 
requested exemption would not significantly impact the environment and swiftly granted the 
exemption.  Revision to Existing Exemptions, 72 Fed. Reg. 56,798 (Oct. 4, 2007).  Although the 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the validity of the exemption, it found that NRC 
had not provided for any public input during its environmental review and had offered any 
explanation for why public participation was not required prior to the issuance of its EA. 
The court devoted much of its analysis discussing the CEQ’s requirements for public 
participation during the implementing of NEPA.  The court noted that CEQ’s regulations identify 
public scrutiny as an “essential” part of the NEPA process in 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(b).   Also, the 
court noted that CEQ requires agencies to make “diligent efforts to involve the public in 
preparing and implementing their NEPA procedures” and “solicit appropriate information from 
the public.” 40 C.F.R. § 1506.6(a), (d).  Such involvement can include public hearings 
“whenever appropriate,” a determination informed by whether there is “[s]ubstantial 
environmental controversy concerning the proposed action or substantial interest in holding the 
hearing.” 40 C.F.R. § 1506.6(c).  Ultimately, the Brodsky court never reached the question of 
whether CEQ regulations apply to NRC, but found that it could not uphold NRC’s action without 
an explanation of what public participation procedures NRC followed during its NEPA analysis.     
VII. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
While NRC has attempted to distinguish itself from CEQ in terms of substantive NEPA 
requirements, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has arguably taken a more 
aggressive approach.  FERC is an independent agency that regulates the interstate transmission 
of electricity, natural gas, and oil.  FERC also reviews proposals to build liquefied natural gas 
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terminals and interstate natural gas pipelines as well as licensing hydropower projects.  FERC’s 
structure, with five commissioners at the helm of the agency, is very similar to NRC.  
Similar to NRC, FERC’s NEPA regulations are clear that CEQ regulations are not 
binding on the Commission.  However, FERC noted that it agrees with the policies reflected in 
CEQ’s regulations. Accordingly, FERC structured its NEPA regulations “as closely as 
practicable to the essential procedures reflected in the CEQ regulations, while ensuring that its 
regulations are consistent with its independent regulatory duties.”  44 Fed.Reg. 50,052 (1979).   
a. Monongahela Power Co. vs. FERC, 39 FERC 61,350 (1987) 
Historically, FERC’s policies have been hostile to the concept of environmental review.   
This hostility was expressed by FERC’s Commissioners in Monongahela Power Co. vs. FERC.  
In Monongahela, the Allegheny Power System (APS) filed with the Commission, pursuant to 
section 205 of the Federal Power Act, three interrelated agreements for the sale by several 
utilities of up to 450 megawatts of firm energy and related capacity through APS.  Several 
groups intervened in the proceeding, including the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC).  
In its petition, NRDC asserted that FERC was required to prepare an environmental impact 
statement (EIS) because the acceptance for filing and approval of the rates constituted major 
federal actions that significantly affect the quality of the human environment, for which an EIS is 
mandated by section 102(2)(c) of NEPA.  One of NRDC’s primary environmental concerns was 
that the proposed sale would involve the increased use of existing generating plants that are not 
currently operating at full capacity.  In addition, the plants involved in the sale were 
grandfathered from certain provisions of the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. § 7411) and were not 
required to meet the current source performance standards for coal-fired generating plants. 
FERC concluded that the preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement was not 
required in Monongahela because the acceptance of rates is not an “action” affecting the 
environment within the meaning Section 102(c) of NEPA and 40 C.F.R. Part 1500.  FERC noted 
that “major federal actions” are defined in 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18 as actions with environmental 
“effects” that are actually or “potentially subject to federal control or responsibility.”  
Accordingly, FERC proposed a rule in 1987 that would establish as categorical exclusions from 
NEPA electric rate filings submitted by public utilities and the establishment of just and 
reasonable rates pursuant to sections 205 and 206 of the Federal Power Act.  FERC maintained 
the position that Congress had not granted the Commission authority to reject rate filings on 
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environmental grounds.  FERC further opined that the provisions of NEPA were not intended to 
affect the specific statutory obligations of any Federal agency.  In other words, in terms of NEPA 
and the environment, FERC takes power plants as it finds them.   
b. Order 888 
Subsequent to Monongahela, FERC reiterated its position on environmental reviews 
when it issued Order 888.  This action consisted of a final rule requiring public utilities that own, 
control or operate facilities used for transmitting electric energy in interstate commerce to have 
on file open access non-discriminatory transmission tariffs that contain minimum terms and 
conditions of non-discriminatory service.  FERC initially concluded that no EA or EIS was 
necessary because the regulation fell within the categorical exclusion for electric rate filings. 
However, FERC eventually acquiesced to the requests of several commenters, including the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and prepared an EIS.  The commenters were 
concerned that promoting competition among generators could lead to an increase in harmful 
emissions, especially nitrogen oxides.  Although FERC concluded that the order would only 
affect air quality slightly (if at all) and that the environmental impacts are as likely to be 
beneficial as negative, FERC resisted on alternative grounds calls for it to adopt mitigation 
measures.  Primarily, it asserted that it lacked the legal authority to adopt mitigation measures.  
FERC characterized itself as “in essence and by law” an “economic regulator.”  61 Fed. Reg. 
21,672. 
The Administrator of the EPA referred FERC’s environmental analysis to CEQ, pursuant 
to section 309 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7609, and 40 C.F.R. Part 1504.  Although EPA 
did not necessarily oppose FERC’s underlying action or environmental analysis, EPA was 
concerned with potential longer term effects of Order 888 and held the position that the nitrogen 
oxide emissions associated with the rule should be addressed as part of a comprehensive 
emissions control program developed by EPA and the States under mechanisms available under 
the Clean Air Act.  In essence, EPA was encouraging FERC to incorporate mitigation strategies 
in its EIS.   
FERC disagreed with both the substantive and institutional reasons with EPA’s referral to 
CEQ.  In its Order responding to the referral, FERC declined to take part in the process and 
voiced its disapproval of EPA’s interference.  FERC stated that it was “inappropriate for EPA to 
refer this agency's action based upon narrow analytic differences in the absence of strong and 
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well- tested evidence of environmental harm.”  FERC noted its greater concern with  
“the difficulties associated with the referral of an action of an independent regulatory agency.”   
FERC stated that although the regulations of the CEQ are “useful as a mechanism for resolving 
disputes in the executive branch,” they “raise significant questions” with respect to their 
application to actions of independent regulatory agencies.  FERC concluded that it must make its 
decisions with respect to Order 888 solely based on the record in the proceeding and without the 
interference from CEQ and the executive branch.  FERC noted that, despite its opposition to 
EPA’s referral, it would appropriately engage in consultations and exchanges of information in 
order to facilitate resolution of disputes with other agencies.   
VIII. Conclusion 
In light of the foregoing, CEQ’s role with respect to independent agencies appears to be 
limited.  However, this is not necessarily the case.  In Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 
(1979), the Supreme Court stated that CEQ’s interpretation of NEPA is entitled to “substantial 
deference” in light of its important role in implementing the statute.  The Andrus Court resolved 
a split among the circuit courts over the interpretive authority of CEQ ( i.e., whether its 
interpretations were “merely advisory” or entitled to “great weight”).  While Andrus may have 
settled this issue, it did entitle CEQ to the complete deference provided by Chevron U.S.A. v. 
NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) because NEPA is administered by all federal agencies (not 
exclusively CEQ).  In other words, CEQ’s interpretation of NEPA would not necessarily control 
where a different agency proffered a different alternative (as in Limerick Ecology Action).   
 While both NRC and FERC have been careful to preserve their respective status as an 
“independent” regulatory agency, each agency has largely adopted CEQ’s guidelines and 
policies in their own NEPA regulations.  Therefore, the only likely tension remaining between 
these independent agencies and CEQ requirements would involve “substantive” NEPA 
requirements that interfere with the agency’s statutory obligations.  The examples discussed 
above with respect to Limerick Ecology Action and Order 888 have been rare.  Both NRC and 
FERC have demonstrated their willingness to work with CEQ as they implement NEPA, which 
highlights CEQ’s position as a valuable resource with special expertise regarding environmental 
analysis and government decision-making.  Based on the lack of major disagreements between 
independent agencies and CEQ and the alignment of NEPA regulations with CEQ’s guidelines, 
11 
 
the future will likely produce further harmony for environmental reviews within the executive 
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